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Abstract
This paper investigates to what extent fair trade programmes, are indeed ‘fair’. This is
accomplished by comparing fair trade with free trade and protectionist trade regimes on their
compliance of the criteria set by the fair trade movement itself. This comparison is made using
comparative cost based and economies of scale models. It is found that whether or not fair
trade is superior to free trade or protectionism is highly dependent on a number of
characteristics of the products to which fair trade is applied as well as on the circumstances of
international trade.
Mailing Address: A. de Vaal, Nijmegen School of Management, University of Nijmegen, PO
Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands; a.devaal@nsm.kun.nl
1. Introduction
A long-standing debate in development economics has been the one between
advocates of free trade and proponents of protectionism in developing countries.
While the former argued that free trade would offer large opportunities for poor
countries to improve their situation, the latter considered trade to be harmful to poorer
countries and typically preferred a combination of protectionism and development
aid. This opposition tended to dominate the discussion about the role of international
trade in the Third World. (Bhagwati, 1993; Krueger, 1990)
However, in recent years, a third position has come up. This position
maintains that international trade can be beneficial to developing countries as long as
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2it is performed in a just manner. The idea is that, in conducting trade, we have a moral
obligation to pay decent prices for products that have been produced under decent
conditions. In many western countries organisations have arisen which conduct trade
in such a way and which succeed in selling products for a price above market level,
because of their guarantee that the extra money is directly going to the producers.
Such organisations, which include for example Oxfam in the United Kingdom, Max
Havelaar in the Netherlands or Solidar’monde in France, have become known as Fair
Trade Organisations (FTO’s)2. The past two decades saw a strong growth of the
market share of these organisations as well as of the range of products they offer. In
addition, the type of conduct they embody –fair trade– has succeeded in gaining
widespread acceptance among the public as being an effective tool for alleviating
poverty and a reasonable alternative to aid and free trade (Beuningen, 2000)3.
The idea that paying higher prices for products from Third World countries
will help development may have a certain intuitive appeal, but if one looks beyond
the direct income transfer effect, it is far from evident that this would be the case. One
can imagine that the practice of fair trade organisations might lead to market
responses that cause adverse effects if one takes on a more broad perspective. In spite
of this, these organisations claim that trade conducted the way they do is fair, which is
a view that is widely shared among the public. In this paper we would like to study
the validity of this claim.
In order to do this we need first to make clear what fair trade exactly is.
Confusing in this respect is the fact that the term “fair trade” nowadays is used to
indicate two entirely different positions. The first of these is the fair trade that calls
for protectionist measures by developed countries against products that have been
produced in poorer countries at prices developed countries cannot compete with
because of their different economic circumstances. Protectionism is defended by
arguing that trade should only be conducted on a level-playing field. Ultimately this
means that all comparative advantage due to differences between countries should be
eliminated by policy; in practice, the argument is mostly used to protect domestic
industries in developed economies against cheaper imports from countries with low
labour costs. This argument has been attacked convincingly in Bhagwati (1993). See
also Bhagwati & Hudec (1996) for an overview of the issues involved.
This protectionist stance is completely different from the concept of fair trade
we will discuss in this paper. The fair trade which we will deal with is a manner of
conduct by consumers, engaged in pro-poor trade with developing countries. “Fair
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 Although recently the growth seems to have stagnated, as can be deduced from following the media.
3trade” in this paper refers to the consumer movement that has come up in several
western countries in the past decades, in which people feel obliged to (1) pay prices
above market level for products that (2) are produced under certain conditions in
Third World countries. Crucial in this practice is that restricting oneself to goods
produced under these conditions and paying the higher, decent prices both are
considered to be moral obligations rather than preferences; only this type of conduct
is considered to be just.
The moral obligation to act in a fair trade manner stems from an idea of
justice that lies underneath the fair trade concept. The conduct called fair trade, in
other words, is an operationalisation of an idea of what just trade would be. To give a
satisfactory answer to this latter question – what is just trade? – would require a study
by itself and goes far beyond the scope of this paper. However, the two elements of
the fair trade type of conduct, that is: buying products produced under decent
conditions and paying higher prices for these products, address two notions of justice
that have an intuitive appeal to most members of our society. The first of these two is
the notion that to be involved in certain types of conduct is intrinsically wrong (e.g.
child labour, political coercion). For trade to be just it has therefore to abstain from
products produced under circumstances that violate such basic principles. This is a
minimal requirement without which it makes no sense to talk about fairness in the
first place.
The second notion of justice behind the fair trade approach is the idea that in
our actions we should try to counter unjustified inequality by improving the situation
of the least well off in society. The term unjustified inequality reflects the recognition
that some inequalities might be deserved through differences in effort or defendable
because no one would gain by their eradication. Unjustified inequality then is
inequality that does not come to the absolute advantage of the poor nor is the result of
a difference in effort4,5. The reduction of such unjustified inequality is what the fair
trade practice of paying higher prices is intended to bring about. In the words of the
Fair Trade Foundation: “by requiring companies to pay above market prices, Fair
Trade addresses the injustices of conventional trade, which traditionally
discriminates against the poorest, weakest producers”6.
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4To study the validity of the claim that fair trade is fair thus calls for a
confrontation of fair trade with free trade and protectionism on both of these grounds.
With respect to the ‘decent conditions’ requirement, however, it is obvious that fair
trade is superior to the other positions in the international trade debate: the fair trade
practice is the only way to guarantee the fulfilment of the minimal requirements.
Surely, free trade or protectionism may, in some or many cases, lead to absence of
child labour or environmentally harmful production techniques, but such an outcome
is always in a way “by chance”; were it profitable to have things otherwise, it would
be done. Under a fair trade regime such an outcome is not possible, since it is a moral
obligation to buy only products which are produced under decent conditions.
With respect to the second aspect of fairness – improving the condition of the
least well off – the superiority of fair trade is by no means clear though. Provided we
accept the objective of improving the situation of the least well off, the question is
whether or not paying higher prices for Third World products is indeed the best way
to achieve these income distributional requirements. In other words: is fair trade fair
in the sense that it improves the situation of the least well off? This is the question we
will focus on in this paper. For brevity’s sake we will refer to trade that fulfils this
requirement as being “consequence fair”, as it is fair in the consequences it has for the
least well-off. In trying to answer the question on consequence fairness we do as if
the “decent conditions” requirement is always fulfilled, since otherwise it makes no
sense to speak of fair trade in the first place. More concretely, we thus only consider
trade in products not involving child labour, political coercion, etc.
The analysis will take place in two steps. In the first step, we will deal with
the question how international trade and protectionism respectively fare on the
consequence fairness requirements of the fair trade movement. In the second step we
investigate whether fair trade might be an improvement in this respect to either
protectionism or free trade. We note that in the comparisons we make we will only
deal with the consequences on the income distribution of trade and we ignore other
effects international trade might have on the well-being of people (e.g. environmental
externalities). This limitation is defendable by the fact that it is the angle taken by
most international trade models, and by the fact that it can be shown that external
effects of economic actions can in principle be ‘solved’ by creating marketable
property rights for these factors7.
In our investigations we will make a distinction between comparative cost
based trade models and trade models that take economies of scale as a reason for
trade. This distinction is useful for two reasons. First, although in comparative
advantage based trade models free trade is typically superior to no-trade on a country
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5level of analysis, not everyone in a country gains from trade. In models that are based
on economies of scale, on the other hand, income distributional effects within
countries are typically absent (unless they also incorporate comparative advantage
elements), but then the gains from trade on a country level are not always positive. 8
This is mainly true for models that incorporate external economies of scale, which are
either directly modelled (e.g. Ethier, 1979), or come about as a result of pecuniary
externalities that are generated by the interaction of returns to scale at the firm level
and the existence of transportation costs (e.g Krugman, 1991, Krugman & Venables,
1996, as well as many other advances in the new economic geography literature).
Second, the distinction is useful to shed better light on the importance of remaining
(natural) barriers to trade on our judgement. In comparative cost based models, the
welfare effects do not qualitatively depend on the extent to which trade is freed
(quantitatively, of course, they do). In economies of scale based models, however, the
distribution of the welfare effects over countries heavily depends on the extent of free
trade (as proxied by the remaining level of transportation costs).
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the fairness of
trade in comparative cost based trade models. Are the income distributional effects of
trade in these types of models in favour or to the detriment of the least well off in
society? Section 3 tries to answer this question on the consequence fairness of trade
for models where economies of scale play a role. Section 4 applies the fair trade
concept to both types of models and discusses whether or not fair trade is superior to
free trade and/or protectionism. Section 5, finally, concludes.
2. Consequence fairness of trade in comparative advantage
trade models
In this section we deal with the consequence fairness of trade when it is based on
comparative cost differences between countries. Since the work of David Ricardo, it
is clear that comparative cost differences between countries lead to mutually
beneficial trade.9 This basic premise is still theoretically uncontested at a macro level,
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6but it is well known that at the micro level not everyone will gain from free trade. In a
Heckscher-Ohlin type of world, for instance, countries have a comparative advantage
in goods that use the country’s relative abundant production factor intensively. The
trade pattern that follows then implies an increase in the demand for the country’s
abundant factor and a reduction in demand for the country’s scarce factor. With fixed
supply of both factors of production, the abundant factor gains from opening up to
trade, both in nominal terms as in real terms, whereas the scarce factor loses. This has
become known as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.10 By analogy, trade also leads to
convergence of factor prices around the world, which stops once factor prices are the
same everywhere (factor price equalisation theorem). To see this, note that as trade
takes away differences in goods prices between countries (provided both countries
remain incompletely specialised), the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption that production
technologies are identical world wide implies that the cost of production, and hence
factor rewards, should be the same everywhere as well.
These effects on factor rewards give rise to four different ways for looking at
the consequence fairness of trade. The first way to do this is to investigate the
consequences of trade for the income position of each factor separately (Case 1). The
relevant comparison is then for each factor to compare pre-trade and post-trade real
rewards in the country where it was initially worst off. The second way is to
investigate the consequences of trade on the national income distribution (Case 2).
Then the procedure is to find out for each country which factor of production is worst
off before trade, to compare this with its post-trade real factor reward. The third way
is to consider the international income distribution (Case 3). The relevant comparison
is then between the pre-trade and post-trade real factor rewards of the production
factor that was on average initially worst off (Case 3). Fourthly, and perhaps most in
line with the fair trade ideas on fairness, is to make a truly global comparison by first
singling out which of the four geographically bounded income groups is initially
worst off, to then see how they fare after trade has opened up (Case 4).
Of these cases, the first, third and fourth one are most easily to tackle, while
the second one leads to a theoretically irresolvable outcome. Irrespective of the case
under analysis, we will confine our assessment to the standard formulation of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, which exhibits 2 goods, 2 factors and 2 countries. This is
done not only to facilitate tractability, but also since many of the theorems that are
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 Compared to autarky, the price of exported commodities will rise, whereas the price of imported
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7linked to the Heckscher-Ohlin model do not easily generalise to a more-factor, more-
country, more good framework.11
To start with Case 1, where we investigate the consequences of trade for each
factor separately, we note that in the Heckscher-Ohlin model the real reward of a
production factor is lowest in the country where it is relatively abundant. This follows
directly from the one-to-one relation that exists in the Heckscher-Ohlin model
between the physical definition of factor abundance and the price definition of factor
abundance.12 The marginal productivity of a production factor is lower in a country
where it is relatively abundant, which implies a lower real factor reward as well.
Trade increases the real factor reward of each of the factors in the country in which
they are relatively abundant– the Stolper-Samuelson theorem –, which renders it
automatically fair.
With respect to Case 2, which compares the pre-trade and post-trade income
distribution at the national level, we cannot rely on a straightforward application of
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. To begin with, this is because factors of production
may differ in their ownership structures (for instance the ownership of capital may be
more concentrated than the ownership of labour). This implies that whereas a
production factor could be worst off before trade when rewards are measured in per
unit terms, this does not mean that the owners of the production factors are also worst
off. We circumvent this problem – for this case as well as for the other cases – by
assuming that ownership structures do not differ between factors of production. In a
way, this reflects the perfect competitive spirit in goods and factor markets of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model. Note in this respect also that perfect competition already
rules out any influence of the ownership structure on factor rewards.
But even then a clear-cut answer to the question on consequence fairness is
hampered. Although we know that in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework the country’s
abundant factor gains from trade, whereas the scarce factor loses, this does not help
us in determining which of the country’s factors of production was actually worse off
before trade. Only when before trade the real factor reward of the abundant factor is
lower than that of the scarce factor, we can be certain that trade is fair. The
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, however, does not provide a clear answer to this matter.
It only indicates that the initial income position of the abundant factor improves the
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8more intensive production technologies are in the abundant factor and/or the more
consumers favour the good that uses the abundant factor most intensively.
For Case 3, which compares relative income positions from an international
perspective, the problem of not being able to assess which factor is initially worst off
is not obstructive for assessing the fairness of free trade. The point is that when we
are dealing with the comparison on a world-wide scale, we do not need to know
which factor was initially worst off, provided that we can show that the world-wide
income distribution does not change due to trade. Whereas in our analysis on the
national level (Case 2), the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implied that the national
income distribution would change due to trade, this result does not carry over to the
world income distribution. In fact, it is easy to see that in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin
framework the post-trade factor price ratio is equal to the average factor price ratio
before trade. To see this, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that the
world is divided in two countries which have the same relative endowments, but
which do not trade. As a consequence, both countries will face equal factor prices.
When both countries open up to trade, the equal distribution of endowments implies
that countries are indifferent to engaging in trade or remaining autarkic (prices are the
same everywhere). Consequently, the factor price ratio in the post-trade equilibrium is
the same as the autarkic average. Now suppose that one unit of either of the
production factors is moved to the other country. With preferences being the same in
both countries, this implies that the change in the autarchic factor price ratio for the
one country is exactly the same, but opposite, to that of the other country.
Consequently, the autarchic world average factor price ratio does not change and
remains the same as before. But so does the factor price ratio for the post trade
equilibrium, as the total world endowment ratio did not change. Hence, in a
Heckscher-Ohlin setting, the weighted world average of autarchic factor price ratios
is always equal to the post-trade world factor price ratio.13 Irrespective of which
factor is initially worst of on a global scale, we can therefore conclude that in Case 3
trade is always  fair (as we know that there are gains from trade).
The verdict on Case 4, which makes a comparison between each and every
income group in the world, is relatively easy and follows directly from the fact that
the income group that is initially worst off must always comprise the owners of a
production factor that is relatively abundant somewhere (otherwise, the owners of this
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9production factor in the other country would be worse off). The Stolper-Samuelson
theorem then implies that these owners will gain from trade, which renders trade fair.
Overall then, we may conclude that trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin model fares
quite well on consequence fairness. The exception is when we consider the income
distribution on a national level (Case 2), in which case the verdict is inconclusive. But
since this is primarily because of the general set-up of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory,
which leaves open which factor of production is initially worst off, we do not regard
this as a major problem.14 Consequently, we conclude that free trade based on
comparative advantage is fair. Table 1 summarises our findings so far.
Table 1: Consequence fairness of trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin
model
Way of assessment Is trade fair?
Per production factor (Case 1) Yes
National income distribution (Case 2) Unclear
International income distribution (Case 3) Yes
Per income group (Case 4) Yes
3. Consequence fairness of trade in new economic geography
trade models
As we have seen, in comparative advantage ridden trade models trade is beneficial for
all countries concerned, even though on a national level there are income
distributional effects. It is because of that feature that these models are typically
applied to understand the impact of trade on relative factor rewards within a country.15
Alternatively, in trade models that are based on economies of scale the focus is much
more on the effects of trade on the income distribution between countries. Although
this is partly resulting from the fact that these models typically feature a single factor
of production, the prime reason is that in economies of scale ridden models it is not
necessarily true that countries gain from trade. In the trade literature that deals with
scale economies, this has been shown to be primarily true when the economies of
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scale are external to the firm; that is, when the average costs of production depend on
sectoral output levels instead of output levels of firms, see e.g. Ethier (1982). This
could imply that the country which is the high cost producer for each conceivable
scale of production, may in fact be the low cost producer in autarky because of a
higher scale of sectoral operations compared to its low-cost counterpart. Upon trade,
therefore, the high cost country may therefore actually export the good, which
reinforces its scale advantage over the other country and leads it to completely
specialise in it.16 Such an outcome is not desirable, however, as the optimal solution
would have seen specialisation in the low cost country. Trade thus leads to the
‘wrong’ specialisation pattern, which is not only harmful for the low cost country, but
also for its high cost counterpart.
A valid criticism on the applicability of these types of models is that they do
not give a clear clue on what determines the pre-trade autarkic production levels. As a
consequence, it is a matter of chance which country has the actual cost advantage in
autarky. Moreover, much of the external economies of scale models do not pay
attention to the origin of external economies of scale. They take the negative relation
between sector scale and average production costs as a given in order to analyse the
consequences of such a cost structure on international specialisation pattern.
These flaws are mended by the advances of the new economic geography
literature. In this strand of literature17 the location of industrial production ultimately
depends on the balance between agglomerating and spreading forces that are present
due to a combination of returns to scale at the firm level and the existence of
transportation costs. As this implies that it pays for firms to settle in the larger market,
a small difference between countries may give rise to a process of cumulative
causation, which leads to a concentration of industrial activity in one country. By
relating these processes to well-specified cost and demand factors, economic
geography models are not only able to explain why economic clustering takes place,
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Venables (1999) and Neary (2000) for surveys on the new economic geography literature.
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but also under which conditions it is most likely to take place. In addition, these
models specify how the advantages of economic clustering (i.e. external economies of
scale) come about.18
We will use the set-up of economic geography models to discuss how trade
affects the income distribution within countries for a given distribution of labour over
countries. That is, we will use the so-called short-term specification of economic
geography models and ignore the consequences of (potentially emerging) core-
periphery patterns on wages. By deliberately ignoring these long-run effects, we
therefore exploit the resemblance new economic geography models have with new
trade models. To underscore this, we will henceforth refer to these models as either
new economic geography trade models or as static economic geography models.
In the standard exposition of new economic geography trade models we will
use, the world consists of two regions (or countries), which each produce a
homogenous agricultural good, which serves as numéraire, and a heterogeneous
manufactured good. The agricultural good is produced under constant returns to scale,
whereas the manufactured good incurs positive scale economies. Labour is sector-
specific and (in the short-run, which we focus on) also immobile between regions.
Trade in agricultural products is costless, but trade in manufactured goods incurs
transportation costs. Both regions are equally large in terms of agricultural labour, but
typically not in manufacturing labour. The standard result in such a setting is that free
trade always means higher (nominal) manufacturing wages in the large country and,
by symmetry, vice versa for the small country, but that the exact post-trade wage
level depends highly on the extent to which free trade lowers transportation costs. In
fact, for the large country manufacturing wages are an inverse U-shaped function of
falling transportation costs, such that when trade is completely free, nominal wages
are the same in both countries.19 The relation between real manufacturing wages and
transportation costs only partly reflects this pattern, as then we also have to
acknowledge the impact of the falling transportation costs on the price index of
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for a detailed analytical account.
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manufactured goods. In fact, whereas for a given level of transportation costs the
price index is always lower in the larger region – because of its lower dependence on
transportation costs including imports, see Neary (2000) – this advantage for the
larger region declines when transportation costs decrease. Thus, real wages are bound
to start converging at a higher level of transportation costs than was the case for
nominal wages. The same applies to real wages in agriculture: given the constant
nominal wage of agricultural labour (numéraire), the development of the price indices
in both countries when transportation costs fall implies that also agricultural real
wages become equal at completely free trade.
This is exactly what is shown in Figure 1, in which manufacturing real wages
(panel A) and agricultural real wages (panel B) are depicted as a function of falling
transportation costs. Both panels of Figure 1 are based on simulation results for a
standard version of the economic geography model, as presented in Fujita, Krugman
and Venables (1999, Chapter 5), including the normalisations they have chosen.20 The
parameter configuration underlying Figure 1 is such that both regions are equally
large in terms of the numéraire sector, but that region 1 is the larger region in terms of
manufacturing labour. The share of manufacturing labour in total labour supply is
40%. The economies of scale in manufacturing are intermediate (substitution
elasticity of 5), whereas consumers in both regions spend 40% of their income on
manufactured goods.
(insert figure 1 about here)
Figure 1 gives the results for one parameter configuration only, but extensive
sensitivity analyses shows that the particular curvature of the real wage curves is
indeed as general as the brief description of the main results from the economic
geography literature above indicates. However, the relative position of the real wage
curves depends to a large extent on the parameter configuration chosen. Especially
the share of manufacturing in consumption is important in this respect (as has been
widely acknowledged in the new economic geography literature).21,22 This is
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particularly important when considering consequence fairness. In Figure 2 we have
therefore plotted regional real wages as a function of declining transportation costs
for three distinct levels of expenditure share on manufacturing goods. Panel A
features a low expenditure share, Panel B an intermediate share and panel C a high
expenditure share on manufacturing goods. Note that Figure 2 only facilitates an
assessment of consequence fairness for three of the four ways we used while
discussing fairness in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. That is, it facilitates a
comparison for each factor separately, a comparison for the national income
distribution and a comparison for each group separately. For the international income
distribution position we will require a different figure, which we will give below.
(insert Figure 2 about here)
Upon comparison of the different panels of Figure 2 from the perspective of
Case 1, we conclude that, for both production factors, free trade increases the real
wage in the region where it was initially worst off. That is, if we interpret the opening
up to trade as going from a prohibitive level of transportation costs (autarky) to trade
at zero transportation costs, trade is fair for both production factors. Alternatively one
could argue that part of the transportation costs consists of costs due to natural
barriers to trade (e.g. distance per se) and that therefore the opening up to free trade
does not imply a complete removal of all transportation costs. In comparative
advantage based models, such a distinction does not qualitatively affect the impact of
reducing artificial trade barriers on wages and the income distribution. This is
different in economic geography models, where the (remaining) level of trading costs
is key to understanding the impact on wages of opening up to free trade. In the
remainder of our analysis we therefore take transportation costs to consist of both
natural and artificial trade costs, so that the opening up to free trade can imply any
change from a prohibitive level to a less than prohibitive level of (total) transportation
costs. 23
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 As the agricultural sector is the numeraire sector and bears no transportation costs, the opening up to
trade in manufacturing goods always implies a complete opening up to trade in agricultural goods.
Likewise, autarky in manufacturing goods implies autarky in agricultural goods as well. Moreover, we
leave aside the issue how much of the total transportation costs is due to natural barriers to trade and how
much is due to artificial barriers to trade. As such, when free trade implies a jump from prohibitive
transportation costs to zero transportation costs, we implicitly assume that the whole of transportation
costs consists of artificial barriers to trade. When, alternatively, there would be no artificial barriers to
trade at all, autarky is actually the natural state of affairs. In our analysis, we will only consider situations
in between these two extremes. Note also that in line with the purpose of our analysis, we always
consider a move towards free trade, that is from autarky to a non-prohibitive level of transportation costs.
We will not consider a move towards freer trade, that is a reduction in transportation costs in general.
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By doing so, the judgement on fairness becomes mixed for manufacturing
labour. For instance, if getting rid of the artificial barriers to trade implies that total
transportation costs only become slightly less than prohibitive, Panels A and B
indicate that trade is fair, but Panel C indicates that it is not. In the first two cases, the
real wages in the manufacturing sector of the large country, which is initially worst
off, rise; in the last case, income distribution over the manufacturing sectors is
initially equal, while trade sets off a process in which one group loses and the other
gains. However, when the remaining barriers to trade are such that free trade implies
a jump to a low level of total transportation costs, all panels show such free trade to
be fair. For agricultural labour the verdict on fairness is independent of the remaining
level of transportation costs.
The length of the transportation costs interval for which free trade is unfair
not only depends on the expenditure share of manufactured goods, but also on the
substitution elasticity in consumption and the relative size of both region’s
manufacturing labour forces (among other things). However, as these parameters also
influence the relative position of the real wages curves, the implications of such a
longer interval for the judgement on fairness are not straightforward. To see this
consider Figure 2.A in conjunction with Figure 2.C. It then becomes clear that a
decrease in the expenditure share of manufactured goods, increases the range of
transportation costs for which free trade implies lower real wages in the small region.
At the same time, however, it also implies that it is not the small region’s
manufacturing labour force anymore that is worse off in autarky. In other words, a
decrease in expenditure share ceteris paribus increases the range for which free trade
is unfair, but as other things are not equal it de facto makes free trade fair. We
therefore refrain from a detailed analysis of how the length of the interval depends on
the model parameters. Moreover, irrespective of the outcome of such an analysis, the
main conclusion remains intact: in models where increasing returns to scale give rise
to agglomeration and spreading forces, free trade is not necessarily fair when we
consider each production factor separately.24
When the perspective on fairness is the national income distribution (Case 2),
Figure 2 indicates that irrespective of the expenditure share on manufacturing goods
and irrespective of the level of remaining transportation costs, free trade is always
fair. This is also the case when we make the comparison between each and every
separate income group (Case 4). The assessment becomes different, however, when
                                                     
24
 We recall in this respect, however, that our conclusion is based on applying the short-term version of
economic geography models to the issue of the impact of trade on wages and that we have ignored the
long-run consequences of the movement of labour across borders. But also then the outcome would be
mixed, depending on whether or not full agglomeration is achieved. We refer the interested reader to the
bulk of the economic geography literature, which primarily deals with the long–run consequences of
labour movements.
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we consider fairness of the international income distribution (Case 3). This can be
seen in Figure 3, which gives weighted averages of both country’s real manufacturing
wages and both country’s real agricultural wages as a function of falling
transportation costs. The weights are the respective labour shares of each type of
labour in each country. As before, the different panels of Figure 3 indicate different
expenditure shares on manufacturing goods.
(insert Figure 3 about here)
Whatever the expenditure share on manufacturing, Figure 3 shows that the
conclusion on the fairness of free trade again depends on the level of the remaining
natural trade barriers. When these vanish completely, free trade is fair, but when they
remain significant, free trade is not fair. A complicating factor in this respect is that
the initial position of both factors of production are the same. This is due, however, to
the chosen normalisations in the Fujita, Krugman, Venables (1999) framework, where
the share of industrial labour world wide exactly equals the expenditure share on
manufacturing and where agricultural labour is divided equally across countries. If
this is not the case, initial positions will differ. When the expenditure share exceeds
the world wide labour share of manufacturing, initially agricultural labour is worse
off, thus making free trade fair or unfair depending on the remaining level of
transportation costs. When, however, the expenditure share falls short of the world
wide labour share of manufacturing, initially manufacturing labour is worse off, so
that free trade is always fair.25 We therefore conclude that when the angle of
comparison is the international income distribution, it is unclear whether or not trade
is fair.
Table 2: Consequence fairness of trade in new economic geography trade models
Way of assessment Is trade fair?
Low expenditure
share
Intermediate
Expenditure share
High expenditure
Share
Per production factor Unclear Unclear Unclear
National income
distribution
Yes Yes Yes
International income
distribution
Unclear Unclear Unclear
Per income group Yes Yes Yes
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 The qualitative nature of the curves in Figure 3 remains intact.
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4. Free trade, protectionism or fair trade?
The conclusion we can draw so far is that free trade is likely to be fair in models that
feature constant returns to scale and perfect competition (the Heckscher-Ohlin
model), although nothing decisive can be said from the viewpoint of national income
distribution. In models that incorporate economies of scale and transportation costs,
however, the verdict highly depends on the angle of analysis chosen. The question we
try to answer in this section is whether or not protectionism and/or fair trade do
better?26,27
To start with protectionism, it is obvious that the effects on the income
distribution of protectionist measures are exactly opposite to those for free trade.
Thus, the foregoing analysis suggests that protectionism is not fair when applied in a
Heckscher-Ohlin type of framework, but that in a static new economic geography
type of framework the fairness of protectionist measures depends on the extent of the
natural barriers to trade. If these are low, so that free trade implies a reduction in
transportation costs from prohibitive to close to zero, it was concluded that free trade
is always fair and protectionism therefore is not. If, however, the natural barriers to
trade are quite important, so that free trade only slightly alters the total transportation
costs, we have seen that free trade might not be fair. Invoking protectionist measures
in such a free trade situation might then improve the condition of those worst off (as
in Figure 2.C). Note that this sheds new light on the arguments used by adherents of
for instance dependencia theories, as their argument would typically be that, since
free trade is harmful for those in peripheral regions, protectionism is not bad at all.
The static economic geography framework not only gives the tools to analyse the
validity of this claim, but also partly supports it. Regarded from the perspective of
consequence fairness, protectionism is not always a bad thing.
The next question is how fair trade fares in the models developed above; Is it
superior to free trade and/or protectionism in terms of consequence fairness? We
recall from the introduction that fair trade adherents feel the moral obligation to pay a
decent price for a commodity. This implies that, to judge whether or not fair trade is
                                                     
26
 With respect to the new economic geography trade model, we thereby note that we only analysed one
possible version of this type of model, viz. the core geography model as presented in Fujita et al. (1999).
Though we already pointed out that the basic results of the core model carry over to more intricate model
versions as well, whereas we also performed a sensitivity analysis on the parameters used, we caution to
see the results in the proper perspective. As such, the comparison between fair trade and the outcome of
trade in new economic geography trade models should be taken as indicative, rather than generally
applicable.
27
 To some it is tempting to think about the conduct imposed by fair trade organisations in terms of a
consumer created market distortion. However, such a view ignores the fact that engaging in fair trade is
not an option to consumers but a moral obligation. As a consequence we cannot easily borrow from the
literature on distortions to gain insight in the matter.
17
superior to free trade and/or protectionism, we have to consider how the price
increase of a certain commodity affects the position of those initially worse off. If fair
trade leads to consequence fairness, whereas free trade does not, then we will call fair
trade superior to free trade. If, however, both fair trade and free trade lead to the same
outcome in terms of consequence fairness, say both are fair, then we will call either
one superior if it leads to a higher gain for those initially worse off.
We begin with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. To facilitate the
analysis we assume that the fair trade principles are adhered to in only one country
(say, a rich country) and that these principles apply to products that use the other
country’s (a poor country) abundant factor relatively intensively28. Moreover we
assume that the decent price to be paid is higher than the price that would result from
the free interplay of market forces.29 Note that this decent price is an absolute
measure and is therefore only qualitatively related to the actual level of the free
market price.
The effects of paying a higher price for the products the poor country exports
have more or less the same effect as imposing an import quota for this product.
Whereas under free trade the poor country would start to export the goods which use
its abundant factor intensively until price differences between the countries would be
completely eliminated, now it can only export until the price in the rich country has
fallen to the fair trade level. Exports and international trade are thus limited by the
fair trade program. The effects of this for the income positions of the different income
groups in both countries then follow from a straightforward application of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Trade leads to gains for the abundant factors and losses
for the scarce factors, so limitations of trade lead to limitations of these gains and
losses. In comparison to free trade the abundant factors are therefore hurt by fair
trade, whereas the scarce factors win.
However, in the poor country, the abundant factor is confronted with a second
effect. Apart from the negative income effect of the reduced trade, this sector captures
the rents of the fair trade measure. Whether this positive factor outweighs the
negative effects of the reduction in trade, is dependent on the specific price elasticity
of demand for the product in question. If this elasticity is sufficiently low, the
abundant factor in the poor country gains from fair trade.
                                                     
28
 This assumption makes sense, since fair trade would not focus on a sector in the other country, if this
sector would be worse off in the own country. We note that for much of the analysis in a Heckscher-
Ohlin setting it does not matter which of the two countries is actually the poor country. We therefore
attach the labels ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ partly for convenience only.
29
 Obviously, such a definition can be criticised, and rightfully so!, on lacking any analytical foundation
whatsoever. At the same time it does justice to the feelings that are widespread among adherents of the
fair trade movement, i.e. that market forces do not lead to the ‘right’ prices. Therefore, if we put fair
trade on the stand, then it is also plausible to use their (implied) opinion on what a decent price is.
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If we consider fair trade from the perspective of the income distribution per
factor (Case 1), this renders fair trade inferior to free trade. The abundant factor in the
poor country might gain compared with free trade in some cases, but the abundant
factor in the rich country is always worse off. This is not to say, however, that fair
trade is unfair. Compared to autarky, and applying a similar type of reasoning as we
did for free trade, fair trade is fair, provided the fair trade price for imported goods is
lower than the autarkic price level. As this is also a precondition to have trade, we
conclude that fair trade is fair. Note that this also settles the comparison between fair
trade and protectionism, which is in fact a situation of autarky.
From the national income distribution angle (Case 2), nothing decisive can be
said on the consequence fairness of fair trade. Since we cannot predict which factor is
initially worst off, we cannot say whether or not fair trade leads to a fair outcome.
Nevertheless, we can say that fair trade is never superior to both free trade and
protectionism. To see this, we note that under this case free trade is only fair when the
abundant factors are initially worst off. Since we have seen that fair trade implies a
lower increase in reward for the abundant factors than free trade does, this makes fair
trade inferior to free trade. Likewise, when the scarce factors are initially worst off, so
that protectionism is fair and free trade is not, then fair trade is inferior as it still hurts
the scarce factors of production. Fair trade is thus never an improving option from
this angle.
For the international income distribution between factors (Case 3), the
consequences are more interesting. Recall that we have shown that trade had no effect
on this international distribution. This means that the reduction of trade has no
consequences either, for if trade has no consequences, the amount of trade conducted
cannot matter. However, apart from the income effects of the reduction in trade, fair
trade causes an income transfer from the abundant sector in the rich country to the
one in the poor country. The factor that is abundant in the rich country therefore loses,
while the abundant factor in the poor country gains. In other words, there are changes
to the international income distribution between factors. Moreover, these changes
cause fair trade to be superior to free trade from this perspective, since the factor
which is abundant in the rich country must be better off on global average than the
other factor initially. In a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, this is the only possible reason
why the rich country could be richer than the poor one. Note that this also implies that
fair trade is fair.
Viewed from the fourth angle, the verdict remains inconclusive. The poor
country’s abundant factor must be the group which is worst off initially30. Whether
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 Again, because first, one of the abundant factors must be worst off, and second, the fact that this is the
poor country can only mean that the factor in which it is abundant is less productive than the other factor,
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this group gains from fair trade depends, as we have seen, on the price elasticity of
demand for the product in question. If fair trade focuses on the right products, it
would be superior to free trade; if it focuses on the wrong ones, it would be inferior.
As long as there is trade, the Stolper-Samuelson effects imply that fair trade is fair,
though.
Table 3 summarises our findings for the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade.
Table 3: Superiority in consequence fairness of fair trade in comparative
advantage models
Way of
assessment
Is fair trade fair? Is fair trade superior to…?
Free trade Protectionism
Per factor Yes No Yes
National income
distribution
Unclear Noa Noa
International
income
distribution
Yes Yes Yes
Per income
group
Yes Unclear Yes
a. In cases this option is the fair one.
To make the comparison between fair trade and free trade/protectionism in
the economic geography trade framework is more complicated. This is not only so
since increasing the price of a certain commodity above it’s free market price leads to
consequences that are much less straightforward than in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting,
but also since in an economic geography setting the determination of which factor is
worst off initially is highly sensitive to the exact choice of the model’s parameters.
Take, for example, the second angle we took when judging fairness: the national
income distribution. From Figure 2 it then becomes clear that whereas at low
expenditure shares on manufacturing goods real wages in the agricultural sector are
the lowest in both countries at autarky, this is not true when expenditure shares are
higher. Then, in the larger country manufacturing real wages are lowest, whereas in
the small country agricultural wages are worst off. The same ambiguity applies to a
comparison of the international income distribution.
                                                                                                                             
in which the rich country is abundant. Ergo, its income must lie below that of the abundant factor in the
rich country.
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This makes the judgement on the fairness of fair trade in an economic
geography trade framework highly case dependent, whereas there are also many cases
to consider. Consequently, we take a pragmatic stand and consider the case that is
closest in spirit to most fair trade programmes: a fair trade programme that focuses on
the agricultural sector in the poorest country. For our framework this implies that we
will consider the fairness of fair trade only for the situation where consumers in the
large region are willing to pay a higher price for agricultural products in the small
region.31
To implement the fair trade principle of paying a higher, fair price for
agricultural products from the small region, we first alter our choice of numéraire in
the model. Due to zero transportation costs in agricultural products, price differences
between agricultural products across the world were not possible in the original
model. Thus, in the fair trade version of the model we choose the agricultural product
in the large region as numéraire, with a price one, so that the price of agricultural
goods in the small region can yield a different price. Next, we assume that the latter
are consumed by consumers in the large region only – by virtue of their principles –
while consumers in the small country simply buy agricultural goods where it is
cheapest (which will turn out to be the large region). 32 These assumptions imply that
consumers in both regions maximise utility under the (additional) constraint that they
only buy agricultural goods from the other region.33 With agricultural goods in the
large region numéraire, the market for agricultural goods clears via adjustments in the
wage rate of agricultural labour in the small region. The price of agricultural products
in the small region is therefore endogenous. Note that this is not in line with the
absoluteness of the fair trade principle to pay a decent price.34 As in our set-up,
agricultural labour is evenly spread across countries, whereas the large region always
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 For the parameter configurations we discuss, the large country is always the rich country, both in terms
of total real income, as in per capita income.
32
 As a consequence, all agricultural produce of the small country is exported to the large country  and all
produce of the larger region will go to consumers of the small region. As the transportation costs of
agricultural goods are zero, this only seems a waste of resources.
33
 Due to their fair trade principles consumers in the large region do not longer see agricultural products
as homogenous goods. For them, agricultural products from poor countries are clearly different from
agricultural products produced at home, in the sense that the former is entitled to receive a decent price.
We therefore do not explicitly model a choice between home and foreign agricultural goods for
consumers in the large country. Our assumption that consumers in both regions only buy in the other
region is in line with this reasoning, and with the fact that consumers in the poor region base their choice
on comparing prices, but also serves to circumvent the modelling of intricate rationing schemes when the
supply of agricultural produce in one region is insufficient to meet the demands of consumers of the
other region.
34
 Ideally, one should posit a fixed, minimum price to be paid for agricultural products from the poor
country. Such could be easily accomplished, however, by making agricultural goods in the small region
numéraire. For the results this does (obviously) not matter.
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has the higher income, the market for agricultural goods always clears at a the price
level for the poor region’s agricultural produce that is well above one.
To judge whether or not fair trade is superior to free trade and/or
protectionism, we have plotted in Figure 4 the development of real wages as a
function of falling transportation costs for the original version of the static economic
geography models (reiteration of results in Figures 2 and 3) and for the fair trade
version of the model. As the interpretation of the results does not hinge on the
particular value we attach to the expenditure share on manufacturing, we save space
by only presenting the results for a high level of expenditure share. Our conclusions
are obviously based on a consideration of the low and intermediate expenditure shares
as well.
(insert Figure 4 about here)
Before we proceed with our judgement, it is instrumental to take a closer look
at the relative position of the fair trade curves and the standard model curves  per se.
When trade costs are prohibitive, the real wage levels are obviously identical, as fair
trade principles only exert influence when there is trade. When trade costs are less
than prohibitive, however, a wedge appears between the curves. This wedge is always
the same in the sense that, at a comparable level of transportation costs, fair trade
always implies lower real wages for manufacturing labour and agricultural labour in
the large country, and higher real wages for their counterparts in the small region.
This makes sense as fair trade increases agricultural wages in the small country. As an
initial effect, this will increase the costs of living in the large country and real wages
there decline. In the small country, there is no initial impact on the costs of living as
consumers buy agricultural goods at the same (nominal) price as before. This implies
that the higher wage for agricultural labour directly translates into a higher real wage.
Manufacturing labour in the small region also profits from the higher agricultural
wages due to increased local demand. These effects then work through to yield the
new equilibrium real wage levels. As Figure 4 makes clear, the extent to which this is
the case depends on the level of transportation costs. Roughly speaking, the wedge
between real wages in the fair trade case and the standard case increases up till a
certain level of transportation costs, to remain constant thereafter. This reflects the
changing balance of standard geography effects when transportation costs change.
When transportation costs are high, both countries are relatively insulated from cross-
border real income effects. This becomes less when transportation costs decline.
Ultimately, when transportation costs are zero, there are full cross-border spillovers of
income effects and the wedge can be fully explained by the initial impacts addressed
above.
Upon inspection of Figure 4, it is clear that our judgement on the fairness of
fair trade must be the same as for free trade when we consider the national or
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international income distribution. That is, fair trade is always fair with respect to the
national income distribution, but when we consider the international income
distribution, the judgement on the fairness of fair trade depends on the level of the
remaining natural barriers to trade. Also when we consider fairness from the
perspective of income groups, fair trade leads to the same outcome as free trade: it is
always fair. When, instead, we consider each factor separately, Figure 4 makes clear
that the ambiguity that appeared with free trade disappears when fair trade is the rule:
irrespective of the level of the remaining natural barriers, fair trade is always fair.
This also settles the comparison between fair trade an protectionism. Whereas we saw
that protectionism could be a better option than free trade from a consequence
fairness point of view, this result only carries over to fair trade when we consider the
international income distribution. As Figure 4 makes clear, though, the range of
natural trading barriers for which protectionism might be a better option diminishes
when there is fair trade.
The above does not imply, however, that fair trade is also superior to free
trade and/or protectionism. Take for example the second angle of consideration (the
national income distribution); Figure 4 reveals that whereas manufacturing labour is
initially worst off in the large country, the improvement due to fair trade is less than
with free trade. A similar conclusion can be reached by considering the international
income distribution or the comparison for each factor separately (not in this particular
case, though). With respect to the former, fair trade is only superior when the
remaining natural barriers are low. In many cases free trade is therefore superior to
fair trade. When, however, the perspective is per income group, the figure makes
clear that fair trade is superior to free trade, as it improves the income position of
agricultural labour in the small region more than free trade does.
Table 4 summarises our findings on fair trade in the economic geography
trade framework. The results for protectionism are opposite to those for free trade.
Table 4: On the superiority of fair trade in economic geography trade models
Way of assessment Is fair trade fair? Is fair trade superior to…?
Free trade Protectionism
Per factor Yes Unclear Yes
National income
distribution
Yes Unclear Yes
International
income distribution
Unclear Unclear Unclear
Per income group Yes Yes Yes
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5. Summary and concluding remarks
This paper has put the fair trade concept on the stand by comparing its alleged
fairness with the fairness of other approaches to trade, such as free trade and
protectionism. The notion of fairness we thereby used stems from the fair trade
movement itself and says that trade is fair when it comes to the advantage of the least
well off in society. Fair trade adherents feel morally obliged to live up to this notion
of consequence fairness, which is typically put into practice by paying a higher,
decent price for certain commodities of less developed countries. The other notion of
fairness behind the fair trade movement – an absolute prohibition of certain types of
behaviour in production – has been ignored in this paper, since it is self evident that
only fair trade is capable of guaranteeing its fulfilment.
We answered the question on the fairness of fair trade in two steps. First, we
asked whether free trade was fair according to the fair trade concept of consequence
fairness. Second, we asked whether fair trade was fairer than free trade or autarky.
These steps have been conducted using two different types of trade models, namely
the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade and the static, trade version of the core new
economic geography model.
A summary of the findings is given in Table 5, which presents for both
models the number of angles from which fair trade was found to be superior or
inferior to free trade and protectionism (autarky) and the number of angles for which
this was unclear. It is immediately clear that fair trade is far from an unambiguously
wise option; fair trade sometimes has effects that actually consist of a deterioration
according to its own criterion of fairness. However, perhaps the most striking result
shown by this table is that in most cases it is not possible to say a priori whether fair
trade is an improvement or not. The effects of fair trade were shown to be highly
dependent on the characteristics of the sector in question. In the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, for instance, the effects were to a large extent determined by the market
behaviour of the goods traded. Alternatively, in the economic geography trade model
the level of remaining transportation costs was the most important variable, although
other characteristics as the expenditure share to products influenced the result as well.
In cases where transportation costs are low, free trade most of the time fares better
than fair trade. If transportation costs remain substantial, however, fair trade was
shown to be an improvement to free trade and a reasonable alternative to
protectionism.
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Table 5: Consequence superiority of fair trade in various models
Number of angles
superior to:
Number of angles not
superior  to:
Number of angles
unclear
Free
trade
Autarky Both Free
trade
Autarky Both Free
trade
Autarky Both
Heckscher-
Ohlin
1 3 1 1 0 2 2 1 1
Static
Economic
Geography
1 3 1 0 0 0 3 1 3
The overall conclusion must therefore be that it is by no means clear that fair
trade initiatives are always fairer than other options. However, it is also clear that
there are many cases in which this is true. These conclusions bring important
implications for the policies of fair trade organisations with them. Fair trade
organisations have a valuable concept to offer to producers in developing countries.
However, instead of taking it for granted that fair trade is always good, fair trade
organisations should study the characteristics of the markets they enter and assess
whether fair trade would mean an improvement or not. If this is not the case, these
organisations would do better to focus on other markets. Of course, there are strong
moral arguments for the other element of the fair trade practice, refusing on principle
to trade in products not produced under minimal decent conditions. However, this is
not a reason to pursue the second element, i.e. the payment of prices above market
level, as well. Instead, fair trade organisations might consider a second line of action
for some products, in which these products are sold against market prices but with the
guarantee that some basic principles are respected35.
Two remarks should yet be made, however. In our analysis of consequence
fairness, we have only studied the short run effects of fair trade programs. Fair trade
organisations, however, point at the longer run benefits of their programs as well.
These might indeed very well exist; trade itself might have a negative effect on
transportation costs by inducing technological innovation, for example, which would
make fair trade in the long run a better solution to divergence problems than
protectionism. Other effects might occur as well, such as the reduction of cultural
barriers or the establishment of networks, which reduce transaction costs.
                                                     
35
 Or for which the higher price only reflects the extra cost respecting these principles brings along and is
not an instrument to raise income.
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Secondly, we have studied the effects of fair trade programs only in two
specific general equilibrium models of international trade. These models have little
attention for the specific circumstances under which production by small-scale
producers in Third World countries takes place. When one considers these
circumstances, it is imaginable that fair trade has a function in redressing the
structural market failures that characterise the agrarian economy in many developing
countries. Before giving a definite verdict on the fairness of fair trade, it would
therefore be justified to analyse these possibilities in future research.
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Appendix: The Core Economic Geography Trade Model
This appendix gives the equilibrium conditions of the core economic geography
model due to Krugman (1991) and as employed in 5 of Fujita et al. (1999). The world
it describes consists of two regions (or countries; these terms can be used
interchangeably), which each can produce two types of goods. One good is a constant
returns to scale, homogeneous agricultural good; the other good is a heterogenous
manufacturing good, which exhibits increasing returns to scale. Both goods are
produced with sector specific factors of production that are in fixed supply, that is:
each region has a fixed amount of agricultural and manufacturing labour and in the
instantaneous equilibrium there is neither cross-region nor cross-sector factor
mobility. Consumers in both regions have identical preferences which are Cobb-
Douglas regarding the choice between the two types of goods and Dixit-Stiglitz CES
regarding the choice between different varieties of the manufactured goods (including
imported varieties). The agricultural products is costlessly tradeable and serves as
numéraire; varieties of the manufactured good carry iceberg-type of transportation
cost, that is: upon transportation to the other region, part of the good 'melts' away.
This is to avoid the modelling of a separate transportation industry. Agricultural
labour is divided equally among regions; the amount of manufacturing labour may
differ between regions.
Equilibrium is contained in the following set of equations (for i,j=1,2 and i≠
j):
(A.1) Pii  = bwi/θ ∧ Pij  = bwi /τθ
(A.2) (mii/mij) = (pii/pij) -1/(1-θ)
(A.3) fwi/(1-θ) = piimii + pijmij
(A.4) fNi/(1-θ) = λilL
(A.5) µ(wiλilL + (1-l)L/2) = Nipiimii+ Njpjimji
In these equations wi denotes the wage rate of manufacturing labour in region i; pij
and mij respectively denote the f.o.b. price and f.o.b. quantity delivered by a
manufacturing producer from region i that sells in region j, and Ni denotes the number
of manufacturing varieties produced in region i. Total labour supply in the world is L,
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of which a share l is manufacturing labour and a share λil manufacturing labour in
region i (λi<1). Agricultural labour is equally divided between regions. The
parameters b and f are, respectively, the marginal and fixed labour cost of
manufacturing production; µ is the share of expenditures on manufacturing goods; θ
denotes substitutability in consumption between different manufacturing varieties
(0<θ <1 and 1/(1-θ)>1 is the elasticity of substitution); and τ<1 denotes the iceberg-
type of transportation costs. The equilibrium conditions represent goods market and
labour market equilibrium, while taking into account optimum producer and
consumer decisions and the fact that free entry and exit in industry imply zero profits
for manufacturing producers. In our simulations, we have chosen the following
normalisations (following Fujita et al., 1999) and parameter values: µ=l=0.4; b=θ
=0.8; f=µ/(1-θ)=2; λ1=0.6; λ2=0.4 and L=1. The fair trade version of our model is
obtained by substituting (A.5) by
(A.6a) µ(w1λ1lL + (1-l)L/2) = N1p11m11+ N2p21m21
(A6.b) µ(w2λ2lL + (1-l)Lw2A/2) = N2p22m22+ N1p12m12
where w2A is now the (endogenous) wage rate of agricultural labour in region 2 (the
small region), and adding
(A.7) (1-µ)(w1λ1lL + (1-l)L/2) = (1-l)Lw2A/2
Figure 1: Real wages and transportation costs
A.   Manufacturing 
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
prohibitive high intermediate low
transportation costs
r
e
a
l
 
w
a
g
e
s
Small country
Large country
Figure 1: Real wages and transportation costs
B.   agriculture
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
prohibitive high intermediate low
transportation costs
r
e
a
l
 
w
a
g
e
s
Small country
Large country
Figure 2: Consequence fairness of free trade
A.   Low expenditure share
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
prohibitive high intermediate low
transportation costs
r
e
a
l
 
w
a
g
e
s
Agriculture
small region
Manufacturing
small country
Agriculture
large region
Manufacturing
large country
Figure 2: Consequence fairness of free trade
B.   Intermediate expenditure share
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
prohibitive high intermediate low
transportation costs
r
e
a
l
 
w
a
g
e
s
Agriculture
small region
Manufacturing
small country
Agriculture
large region
Manufacturing
large country
Figure 2: Consequence fairness of free trade
C.   High expenditure share
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
prohibitive high intermediate low
transportation costs
r
e
a
l
 
w
a
g
e
s
Agriculture
small region
Manufacturing
small country
Agriculture
large region
Manufacturing
large country
Figure 3: Consequence fairness and the international income distribution
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